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. Robinson LADB news analyst The election of Jorge Serrano Elias in January as Guatemala's
new president has raised expectations over a negotiated end to the longest-running civil war in
Latin America. Serrano's earlier participation in the national peace dialogue and his promise
to continue the negotiations was a major factor in his electoral victory. In his Jan. 14 inaugural
speech, Serrano said that his government would "work for true peace in Guatemala, not simply
a truce, since an end to the armed conflict will not guarantee peace if the causes which gave rise
to the conflict remain." The negotiations process with Latin America's oldest guerrilla movement
opened in Oslo, Norway, last March. That historic meeting initiated a series of contacts between the
insurgency and different sectors of Guatemalan society. Over the next nine months, the guerrilla
commanders held talks in Spain with the political parties, in Canada with the private sector, in
Ecuador with religious groups, and in Mexico with trade unionists, civic organization leaders, and
with small-scale businesspersons and the academic community. Guatemala's guerrilla movement
began in the wake of an abortive coup d'etat in 1960 by a group of reformist officers who joined
forces with members of the Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT) to form the Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FAR) insurgency, under the leadership of Pablo Monsanto. Ill-prepared to face the massive,
US-supported counterinsurgency drive that ensued, the FAR, although it survived, had been
isolated to remote jungle regions of the country by the end of that decade. Under the military
dictatorships of the 1970s, new insurgent organizations were formed and joined the survivors of
the FAR in renewing and extending insurgent activity. In 1982, four of these organizations FAR,
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA),
and a group within the PGT formed the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The
insurgency became a formidable military-political force in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sparking
fears among Guatemalan elite and US officials that Guatemala would follow Nicaragua's lead and
come under a revolutionary insurrection. The guerrilla advance, however, was stopped by one
of the bloodiest counterinsurgency drives in Latin American history, launched following a coup
d'etat by the evangelical fundamentalist Efrain Rios Montt against the corrupt regime of Gen. Lucas
Garcia. The 1982-84 "beans and bullets" program involved scorched earth campaigns, the forced
relocation of hundreds of thousands of peasants and the total militarization of the countryside,
was aimed at destroying the social base of the revolutionary movement. The counterinsurgency
campaign pushed the guerrillas back and, in the process, killed upwards to 150,000 Guatemalan
peasants, mostly Indians, earning the regime pariah status as a gross human rights violator. The
URNG, although on the defense, was not defeated, and spent the next two years regrouping.
During these counterinsurgency campaigns, the army was transformed from a corrupt instrument
of the traditional oligarchy to a modern institution penetrating all aspects of social and political
life, and indeed, civil society itself. By 1985, the army claimed that guerrillas "no longer exist" in
Guatemala and, in the context of its National Stability Doctrine, decided to return the government
to civilian rule. Esquipulas and "new thinking": legitimizing negotiations Parallel to the "political
opening" that began with the 1985 elections, two related developments were perceived as paving
the way toward an end to the intractable civil war: the Esquipulas peace process, and international
changes associated with "perestroika" and the termination of the Cold War. First, the August 1987
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Esquipulas regional peace accords called for an end to the civil wars in Central American countries
through negotiation, domestic reconciliation, amnesties, and the demobilization and reintegration
of insurgent forces into civilian society through free electoral processes, and guarantees for their
security and political participation. Days after the peace accords were signed, the Armed Forces
declared that "Esquipulas does not apply to Guatemala." Nevertheless, the government set up a
National Reconciliation Commission (CNR), as called for in the regional plan. The CNR met with
a URNG delegation in October 1987. Among the appointees to the Commission was Jorge Serrano,
a conservative businessperson who had served in the Rios Montt government. Second, as with
Salvadoran rebels (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front), the Guatemalan revolutionary
organizations commenced their own version of "new thinking." As early as 1985, the URNG called
for negotiations to end the conflict, and warmed to the idea of a "national solution" involving
compromise and social reform rather than an insurgent military victory. Despite the momentum
in favor of negotiations, the legitimacy accorded to the revolutionary movement by the URNGCNR meetings spawned military resistance to the talks. In 1988 and 1989, army hard-line factions
led abortive coup attempts which chilled the political atmosphere in Guatemala and put the
negotiations "on hold." Meanwhile, the guerrillas had regained an offensive capacity by 1988,
and began mounting operations beyond their isolated mountain strongholds. In 1990, the URNG
reported a total 3,500 combatants (compared to the army's estimate of 1,000), and that guerrillas
were operating in 12 of the country's 22 provinces, and in its two largest cities. The guerrilla
movement had again become a national issue and, as the electoral process opened, a campaign
theme. In March 1990, after several months of quiet mediation on the part of the CNR, a URNG
delegation, led by ORPA's charismatic leader Rodrigo Asturias (son of famed Guatemalan novelist
Miguel Angel de Asturias), met in Oslo, Norway, with a Commission delegation headed by Jorge
Serrano. The landmark "Oslo Agreement" called for a renewal of the negotiations process and a
peaceful end to the war. The agreement stipulated a series of bilateral talks between the guerrillas
and representatives of diverse social sectors (political parties, the Church, trade unions and
popular organizations, private business) to exchange views and attempt convergence of respective
positions. The talks were to culiminate in government-URNG talks to end the war. According to
the Oslo Agreement, in the final phase of the talks, the two two sides would negotiate the terms for
constituent assembly elections. The assembly would design constitutional reforms and pave the way
for the guerrillas' disarmament and participation in electoral politics. The Oslo talks were followed
by a meeting in El Escorial, Spain in late May 1990 between the URNG and representatives from 19
legally registered political parties, including most of those which participated in the recent general
elections. Participants at the meeting in Spain ratified the need for institutional reforms "to improve
the democratic system and allow the war to end peacefully," and called for "all national groups to
participate in building consensus on the means to create economic, social and political justice in
the country as a basis for lasting peace." The meeting concluded with embraces between Mario
Sandoval Alarcon and URNG commanders. Sandoval heads the extreme right National Liberation
Movement (MLN), participated in the leadership of the 1954 military coup, and is described as the
father of the Guatemalan death squads. For Guatemala observers, the scene was surreal; absolutely
unimaginable just months earlier. After El Escorial, the guerrilla commanders flew to Ottawa
(Canada) to meet with private sector representatives, under the ultra-conservative Coordinating
Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF). CACIF
had earlier said it would not legitimize "any armed group" by participating in meetings with
their representatives. In addition, the National Agricultural Union, a CACIF affiliate, lobbied
against the meeting. International pressure and support for the process from more progressive©2011 The University of New Mexico,
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minded businesspersons, eventually persuaded CACIF to participate. However, CACIF delegation
members emphasized that they were traveling to Ottawa "to hear the guerrillas' positions," and
not to negotiate, much less sign anything. In Quito, religious group representatives agreed with
the URNG that social injustice and historic inequalities are the root cause of the Guatemalan
conflict. The majority added that this does not condone violence as a solution to such problems. In
Mexico, the URNG and grassroot organizations established significant consensus on the need for
demilitarization, democratization and social justice to end the national crisis. Most of the popular
organization delegations expressed reservations over armed struggle. In the wake of the Oslo
peace process, Serrano gained national recognition in Guatemala and credibility as the candidate
who could best promote the peace process. By late 1990, all of the candidates had endorsed the
negotiations. However, it is not clear whether the negotiations flurry of 1990 was mere electoral
campaign demogogy, or represented a breakthrough for the prospects of a peaceful end to the civil
war. The final meeting in the Oslo process, between the government and the guerrillas, was to
have taken place late last year in Guatemala. With the understanding that the new rather than the
outgoing government would be the more appropriate participant, the meeting was postponed. CNR
president Msgr. Rodolfo Quezada (Guatemalan Bishops Conference) has asserted that the URNGgovernment-army talks are "decisive," since they bring together "the parties that have the ability to
reach the agreements necessary to resolve the civil war." On the agenda for such a meeting would
be the different interpretations regarding institutional reform, which in turn is linked to the timing
and conditions for guerrilla demobilization. The URNG and Serrano The URNG insists on several
reforms before disarmament, including demilitarization of the country, reorganization and purge
of the security forces, an end to military impunity, and judicial reforms permitting the effective
rule of law. According to the rebels, military power must disappear "as the nucleus of economic,
social and political decision-making in the country," followed by "the democratic transformations
necessary for the Guatemalan people's political participation" (i.e., guarantees of the individual
and collective security). These issues constitute the URNG's "minimal negotiating position." The
URNG would press for the rest of its program broad- based social and economic transformations
for which the guerrillas have been waging armed struggle for the past 30 years through existing
political institutions and the mechanism of civic-electoral struggle. This is a major change compare
to the URNG's original concept of total victory through armed struggle. The military and CACIF
hard-liners maintain that the guerrillas must first disarm and join the political process before
dialogue takes place. They also argue that there is no need for constituent assembly elections or
other institutional reforms outside of already-existing structures, since at any time the Congress,
through a two-thirds majority, may amend the constitution. The position of the so-called hard-liners
explicitly violates the letter of the Oslo Agreement, which states that dialogue is not contingent on
prior guerrilla demobilization. Serrano's newly appointed defense minister Gen. Luis Mendoza
Garcia reiterated the military position on the matter in late January. Serrano, however, has said
he will talk to the URNG without any such preconditions. A few days after his inauguration, the
president announced he would meet with sectors that have already held talks with the insurgents.
After these discussions, he said he would meet with URNG commanders "without preconditions,
as long as they show a willingness to negotiate." This contradiction between the army and the
president highlights the issue of civilian control over the military, which in turn is linked to one
of the rebels' preconditions for demobilization, or demilitarization of society. Veteran Guatemala
observers have two differing views on the Serrano administration's strategy and prospects for peace.
Some observers say that Serrano will act to convene Congress to enact constitutional reforms, not
to address the grievances of the revolutionary movement but rather to advance his own program.
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The new president recently told reporters that he would like to see reforms which would provide
greater civilian control over government activities currently in the hands of the military, strengthen
Guatemala's "pluralist character," define the "social function of private property," and guarantee
citizens' individual rights. Once such constitutional adjustments are underway, he added, the
guerrillas would have no further justification for refusal to demobilize. Consequently, Serrano's
strategy might be to try and separate the issue of peace negotiations from that of juridical and
governmental reforms. Serrano's earlier contribution to the peace process as a CNR member should
not be interpreted as an intent to achieve reconciliation with the revolutionary movement, say
these observers. Rather, he seeks to delegitimize and defuse the insurgency through "showcase"
dialogue and a reform process carried out on his terms. This would channel current pressures in
favor of the peace process into support for his own program. Serrano seeks to redefine the relations
of power and authority between civilian and military, and between the traditional oligarchic Right
and the modernizing "New Right" technocrats which he represents. In addition, the president seeks
to establish the effective rule of law as part of his own program for restructuring and stabilizing
the Guatemalan economy and society. For this group of observers, Serrano is not interested in
redefining the social class system, and the relations of power between the poor and the wealthy
the great historic divide in Guatemala, and the root cause of instability. If the negotiations process
fizzles out into a convocation of the National Congress to design constitutional amendments without
involving the guerrillas, much less addressing the fundamental issues of demilitarization, social
justice, and the security of all citizens, then prospects for a negotiated settlement are dim. These
issues were precisely the focus of the meetings in Norway, Spain, Canada, Ecuador and Mexico.
Another group of Guatemala observers, however, points to an emerging convergence between
broad sectors of Guatemalan society over the need for a lasting peace, and to favorable international
conditions for negotiations, as indicators that a real basis exists for advancing the peace process.
The private sector and foreign capital require an end to civil war in order to reestablish a climate
favorable to investment and growth. Pressures are building for serious negotiations throughout
Guatemalan society. Last year church and peasant groups founded the "Campaign for Peace" as a
national network to pressure for a negotiated settlement. This nascent peace movement organized
a rally in downtown Guatemala City last December which drew thousands of participants the first
such event in Guatemalan history. The end of the war in Nicaragua and the advanced stage of
negotiations in El Salvador provide a favorable regional context for the peace effort in Guatemala.
The demise of the Cold War has removed Central America from the East-West ideological prism.
This makes it more palatable for US policymakers to recognize entrenched status quos, rather than
popular grievances and movements for social justice, as the greater threat to US interests in the
region, and to therefore make an effective contribution to negotiations. In this more optimistic
of the two scenarios, Serrano's challenge is to muster enough consensus among those who hold
power in Guatemala to favor a negotiated settlement. Given the new government's weak social
base and the current panorama of competition and shifting interests among and within the private
sector, political groups and the military, it is difficult to see how Serrano will be able to accomplish
such consensus, at least in the short or medium term. The current government would certainly
antagonize powerful social sectors, particularly within the military, who are cautious and even
antagonistic to the peace process. In December 1990, the CNR arranged a "bridge meeting" between
outgoing President Vinicio Cerezo, the major presidential candidates, and URNG representatives
to keep the peace process alive and to obtain commitment from all parties to respect the Oslo
framework. Ironically, Serrano was the only politician invited to the meeting who opposed it. He
said, "I will deal with the issue of peace when I am president." Since he is now installed in the
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Presidential Palace, the ball is in Serrano's court. [See also parts 1 and 2 of the series, appearing in
02/22/91 and 02/27/91 issues of CAU.]

-- End --
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